How Can China, the U.S. and China’s Neighbors Interact Positively?

New Developments in Relations between China, the U.S. and China’s Neighbors

　　　Before the 2008 financial crisis, and especially before the U.S. began its “return” to Asia,  relations between China, the U.S. and China’s neighbors in East Asia were not a major issue.  However, since 2010, relations have been stirred up. Take the Cheonan incident, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan, the Huangyan Island confrontation between China and the Philippines, and the South China Sea issue, for example.  Sino-U.S. relations have grown more complex, and sovereignty disputes between China and some of its neighbors have intensified. At the same time, relations between the U.S. and most of China’s neighbors have improved. The U.S.’ decision to “pivot” to Asia contains many objectives. These include consolidating its alliance system, expanding exports to revive its economy, controlling conflicts in the region, and responding to China’s rise etc. The key goal is for the U.S. to maintain its regional dominance.China’s rise has affected U.S. foreign policy. Some Western nations and several of China’s neighbors have interpreted this change as showing “self-confidence”, “arrogance” and even “intimidating” small countries; but from the Chinese people’s perspective, China’s response to territorial disputes reflects the nation’s determination to defend its sovereignty, and to some extent it is a response to U.S. moves in the region. Several of China’s East Asian neighbors have sovereignty disputes with China. They have continued to improve economic ties with China and the U.S., while strengthening their military and maritime law enforcement capacity.

　　Over the past three years, the relationships between China, the U.S. and China’s neighbors have shown the following three characteristics. First, Sino-U.S. mistrust and strategic competition has intensified. Both sides have, however, tried to strengthen communication channels to defuse conflicts. While the Sino-U.S. relationship experienced many ups and downs after the Cold War, it experienced its best period during the George W. Bush Administration because the two sides cooperated economically and in anti-terrorism efforts. Since President Barack Obama took office, and especially after 2010, Sino-U.S. relations have grown more tense. There are three main interpretations of why this has been so. Firstly, American scholars believe that China took advantage of the time when the U.S. was focused on fighting terrorism to grow stronger. Now China’s diplomacy is “increasingly arrogant” and Beijing is beginning to threaten its neighbors. China’s pursuit of “regional hegemony” in East Asia also challenges the U.S. position, and so Washington has had to respond to the “challenges of China’s rise”. The second point of view—largely shared by Chinese scholars and some overseas Chinese––is that the U.S.’ long-term strategic goal has always been to weaken the “next strongest power”. China is now the world’s second-largest economy, and its military is being modernized at a rapid rate. All this worries Washington. Although China has repeatedly said it has no intention of challenging the U.S., that U.S. policy makers believe that China is their biggest competitor. China has merely counter-attacked while managing the relationship with U.S.The third point of view is shared by scholars from all countries, including the U.S., China, and others. They believe that some of China’s neighbors that have sovereignty disputes with China worry about a stronger China and have begun to rely more and more on the U.S. to keep Beijing in check. Meanwhile the U.S. has taken advantage of this fear to contain China’s rise. The author of this article believes that the nature of the Sino-U.S. geopolitical relationship is not one of two big powers battling for hegemony, but rather a reflection of the contradiction between the U.S. trying to hold onto its primacy and China trying to hold onto its sovereignty. China is focused on defending its sovereignty and its right to develop. These aims are not expansionary and nor does China want to crowd out the U.S. This is completely different to how Germany, Japan and the former Soviet Union tried to establish colonies or spheres of influence in the past. However, the U.S. views China becoming the largest trading partner of increasingly more Asian countries, and China’s growing military strength as possibly “affecting its credibility to protect allies”, and posing a challenge to U.S. dominance in the region. U.S. strategic anxiety can be seen in the urgency of its plan to “return” to Asia Pacific and in the fact that domestic politics has been taken over by the need to “restrict China” and defend “American First.” Second, competition and cooperation are connected in Sino-U.S. relations, and this is a feature of big power relationships in the globalization era. In history, the military played a central role in great power rivalry, but nowadays globalization, nuclear deterrence and lessons from the Cold War have woven the military and the economy together. For example, the U.S. says that the main purpose of its “Air Sea Battle” is to defeat the so-called “anti-access and area denial” strategy of the PLA.The U.S. is promoting the “Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP) because it wants to reorganize the regional economic order and weaken China’s regional economic influence.The U.S. wants to join the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, so it can use the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) to constrain China’s maritime activities with multilateral support. Meanwhile, China and the U.S. are strengthening military exchanges, economic cooperation, and both have said they have common interests in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. The U.S. is still pursuing its “contact+prevention” strategy toward China, with growing emphasis on the prevention side. Secondly, China and the U.S. may fall into a comprehensive strategic contest. Competition between established power and emerging power has become one of the common themes of international politics. From the geopolitical perspective, the Sino-U.S. diplomatic game in East Asia is at the so-called “middle fighting” stage. China and the U.S. are now fighting for influence among China’s neighbors. Sino-U.S. relations are different from U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, but many people in the media are now warning of a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing.Strategists in both countries are aware of this danger, and they are trying to establish a new type of major power relationship to avoid this. Efforts include high-level visits, expanding economic and trade relations, strengthening military exchanges, joining Asia-Pacific consultations, and deepening people to people exchanges and local cooperation etc. However, so far, these efforts have failed to ease suspicions and bilateral tensions.

　　Secondly, the relationship between the U.S. and many of China’s neighbors in East Asia has been improving. However, many of these countries are reluctant to “choose sides” between China and the U.S.. China’s East Asian neighbors can be roughly divided into three groups. First are the traditional allies of the U.S.––these are Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand. In recent years, the U.S. has taken advantage of disputes between China and its neighbors to consolidate its alliance system both politically and militarily. For example, after the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands grew extremely tense, the U.S. said that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applied to the islands. This helped the U.S. solve its problem of the relocation of the Futenma military base in Okinawa which threatened to hurt the U.S.-Japan alliance. After the “Cheonan” and the shelling of “Yeonpyeong” Island incidents, the U.S. pulled South Korea into its Asia-Pacific missile defense system. After the Huangyan Island confrontation between China and the Philippines, the U.S. provided military equipment and political support to the Philippines, which paved the way for U.S. troops to “return” to their military bases in the Philippines. In addition, the U.S. has reinforced its Asia-Pacific “South Anchor” by deploying a small number of marines in Australia. The second type of neighbor are those nations which the U.S. is now trying to woo. These countries include Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Mongolia. By interfering in South China Sea disputes and hyping the “China Threat”, the U.S. said it would send four littoral combat ships to Singapore, and expand U.S.-Vietnam military relations. By signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, accrediting ASEAN ambassadors, organizing the U.S.-ASEAN summit and joining in EAS, the U.S. has improved strategic relations with ASEAN, especially its strategic relationship with Indonesia, a major ASEAN country. The U.S. has also courted Mongolia by calling it “a model of democracy in Asia”. The U.S. has supported Mongolia’s “Third Neighboring Country” foreign policy and expanded cooperation in mining and other areas. The third kind of neighbor are those countries which have complex relations with the U.S.––namely North Korea, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. The U.S. has improved relations with all those countries except North Korea. Relations with some of them have improved rapidly. For example, the U.S. softened significantly its Myanmar policy to help push forward political reforms in the country and strengthened their relations. After winning his second term, U.S. president Barack Obama paid a visit to Myanmar, so far the two countries have held exchanges of senior officials and exchanged ambassadors, and Washington has also relaxed economic sanctions on Myanmar to promote U.S. investment in the country. For the long-neglected countries, such as Laos and Cambodia, the U.S. has launched a “charm offensive”. For example, the U.S. backed Laos’ accession to the WTO; Hillary Clinton’s historic visit to Laos made her the first U.S. Secretary of State visiting that country since Mr. Dulles’s visit in 1955. The U.S. also said it would increase aid to Cambodia, and held its first U.S.-ASEAN Business Forum in Siem Reap. In addition, the U.S. launched the “Lower Mekong Initiative” and the “Asia-Pacific Strategic Action Initiative” to provide assistance to countries on the Indo-China Peninsula, expanding contact in the fields of health, education and the environment. During this period, countries having territorial disputes with China, have been hoping they can use the U.S. to counterweigh China. Those countries with no disputes with China are also keen to see China and the U.S. compete against each other, so that they can lift their own status. That is why we have seen a general improvement in relations between the U.S. and countries in the region. On the other hand, China’s neighbors are reluctant to completely move over to the U.S. side. They prefer to “have a foot in both camps”. These countries rely on China for their economy, but also rely on the U.S. for their security, so they do not want to choose sides, nor ally themselves too closely with either side. These different kinds of relationships illustrate the complexity of regional politics.

　　Third, as relations between China and some of its neighbors have worsened and public anger has escalated, governments have tried to stop disputes getting out of control. In recent years, because of an escalation of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, China’s PLA has started training in the east part of the first islands chain and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have shifted their focus to the southwest border. China-Japan relations have soured. Japan’s recent “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Islands has undermined the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations. China responded strongly and the Chinese public reacted angrily. Bilateral relations faced a huge challenge at the 40th anniversary of the normalization of the two countries’ diplomatic relations. After the “Cheonan” and “Yeonpyeong Island shelling” incidents, South Korea accused China of “favoring” North Korea. China, meanwhile, is concerned about the scale of U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. China-South Korea relations have been damaged to some extent. Vietnam enacted the Vietnamese Law of the Sea, which has an impact on the South China Sea issue and has improved U.S.-Vietnam military relations. As well as a clash of public opinions in the two countries, the two governments are also openly in dispute, so we should not underestimate the risks. Sino-Philippines relations are shadowed by the Huangyan Island confrontation. However, all along, China has reiterated its peaceful development strategy, and has placed special emphasis on regional diplomacy. China has tried to maintain “an amicable, good-neighborly, prosperous neighborhood” policy, but also at times has appeased some of its neighbors, intensifying efforts to improve political, economic, military and diplomatic cooperation. For example, China and Vietnam maintain frequent visits of high level officials and the two sides have pledged to further advance their ties. The two nations have held five defense and security meetings and carried out a number of joint patrols in the Beibu Gulf. Similarly, top officials from China and South Korea have agreed to abide by two joint documents issued in May and August 2008, which express their intention to strengthen political and strategic mutual trust, expand pragmatic cooperation, and improve public opinion of each other in each others countries. China is also beginning to improve relations with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia with Beijing stepping up diplomatic efforts in those countries. Beijing is both continuing with its original policy and also responding to U.S. strategic pressure. To some extent, the U.S.’ “return” to Asia has pushed China to pay more attention to regional politics and work towards setting up a regional free trade area.

Three Predictions

　　The U.S.’ strategic shift eastwards has not only affected Sino-U.S. relations, but also the diplomacy of China’s neighbors. The interaction between China, the U.S. and China’s neighbors is changing the strategic environment in East Asia, making it difficult to predict how each party will behave in the future and complicating issues. What we need to realize is that because of the intensity of the politics, there is less room for maneuver. One party’s “trivial” action may trigger a chain reaction and end in a major event. The author of this paper has used system theory and the principle of “starting from the worst case and working towards the best case”, to predict three different scenarios for the future of ties between China, the U.S. and China’s neighbors.
　　　The first scenario is one where the arms race intensifies, and China and the U.S., or China and one of its neighbors may “fire at each other by accident” during air or sea reconnaissance, during military patrols, and or during a confrontation. If the ensuing crisis is not handled properly, it may escalate into a conflict or limited war, which would drastically change the geopolitical and economic environment of East Asia. Because of how each party is conducting military spending and deployment, we can foresee that the West Pacific will become more “crowded”. The U.S. has said it will deploy 60% of its battleships to Asia-Pacific over the next 10 years. China’s rise and its growing focus on sea power has meant a stronger Chinese navy, air force and marine force.  Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam and some other countries are also boosting their military budgets. Several events, such as the Sino-U.S. “aircraft collision” incident, the “Impeccable” incident, and the USS “McCain” and Chinese submarine incident, the overlapping of law enforcement and patrol waters between China and Vietnam, and the Huangyan Island confrontation between China and the Philippines, illustrate how easy it would be for a serious conflict to break out in the region. Because China’s strategy is to pursue a peaceful rise, Beijing would not be the party to first provoke a conflict, but some neighbors which have territorial  disputes with China may feel that “time is not on their side” when faced with an increasingly powerful China, and they are more often using the U.S. to counter China. The U.S.’ “rebalance” strategy has been skillfully designed. The U.S. endeavors not to let a third party manipulate it but it does not have the capability to completely control its allies. In order to consolidate and expand their vested interests, some neighboring countries have taken the plunge and “dragged the U.S. into the water”. The National Interest published an article on the Huangyan Island dispute which pointed that: “It would not be the first time that a small client state  emboldened by the perceived backing of a large, powerful patron, managed to entangle that patron in a dangerous quarrel. Washington needs to back off.”Similarly, some Japanese politicians want to make use of the Diaoyu Islands dispute to allow Japan to be allowed to have a “normal” military again. The Diaoyu Islands conflict has been growing more tense, and the risk of a clash is growing more likely. Japan may force the U.S. to get involved. If there an air-sea clash between China and the U.S. or its neighbors, for example a ship or plane crash, or an incident with a small number of casualties, then there would be at least two consequences. First, there would be a sharp rise in public anger and the political atmosphere would seriously deteriorate. This would in turn cause China, U.S. or China’s neighbors to arm themselves even faster. Second, all parties recognize the risk of a confrontation and so manage the crisis and the incident does not blow up. If a limited war was to break out it would have serious geo-political and economic consequences. China and the U.S. could improve their strategic cooperation to stabilize the situation, but what would be more likely to happen is that the parties involved would be forced to behave belligerently because of domestic political concerns. This would lead to the rapid deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations and relations between China and its neighbors, while relations between the U.S. and China’s neighbors would grow stronger. If conflict breaks out between China and the U.S., ASEAN’s status and influence will decline, and the strategic position of “extraterritorial powers”, such as Russia and India will grow stronger. Relatively speaking, India has fewer interests in the region, but as a power which has had an important impact on Southeast Asia, it will quickly interfere. Parties may win or lose politically if a conflict erupts, but all parties will lose economically. China’s trade environment would deteriorate, foreign direct investment would plummet, shipping channels would become less secure, economic relations between the U.S. and East Asia, including China, would suffer. The U.S. would find it more difficult to revive its economy and restore fiscal health. Some neighboring countries will fall into severe economic decline, or even maybe social turmoil because of the worsening economic situation in the region. China, the U.S. and China’s neighbors should avoid such a scenario, but each party may believe the other party would not let the situation get out of hand, or because of domestic pressure it may be willing to risk it. Countries may become more aggressive and so the risk of crisis will loom.

　　In the second scenario, the U.S. increases its strategic investment, and continues to provoke tensions between China and its neighbors. Sino-U.S. relations worsen, destabilizing East Asia.  The U.S. is focused on “pushing back” China’s “excessively-expanding” influence in East Asia to maintain its own dominant position. Although the U.S. has repeatedly claimed that it welcomes a “strong and prosperous” China and holds “no position” on sovereignty disputes between China and its neighbors, in practice it does not practice what it preaches. For example, when Vietnam passed its Vietnamese Law of the Sea effectively making China’s Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha (Spratly) islands part of so-called Vietnamese “sovereignty” and “jurisdiction” the U.S. made no protest. However, when China set up Sansha city and Sansha garrison the U.S. released a statement opposing the moves. This “selective behavior” has exposed the fact that the U.S. has indeed “chosen a side” and wants to “make mischief”. Over the past three years, the U.S. has played the role of an “unjust” mediator in several disputes between China and its neighbors. It is also very obvious that the U.S. has been trying to weaken China’s influence on the region’s economy. During Hillary Clinton’s visit to Cambodia in 2010, she advised Cambodia to “avoid relying too much on China”.The U.S.’ strategic offensive is to exacerbate territorial disputes in East Asia, and worsen China’s security environment. So far, China has continued to try to expand and deepen Sino-U.S. cooperation, such as proposing making a new type of major power relations between the two countries and improving economic relations. China has also shown restraint in disputes with neighboring countries. It has promoted the China-Japan-South Korea and “10+3” FTA , and has also made no moves to criticize the TPP. But the U.S. has not welcomed China’s moves and this has caused Chinese media, military, scholars and think tanks become more skeptical about Washington’s motives and those of some neighboring countries. This line of thinking has not yet permeated to the policymakers’ level, but inevitably it will create some pressure. If the U.S. continues to squeeze China’s strategic space, it will inevitably push China to oppose the U.S.. The Center for Strategic & International Studies’ Bonnie S. Glaser pointed out that the U.S.’ pivot towards Asia has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China, which will restrict efforts in China’s top political levels to dampen rivalry. If China decides that the U.S.’ “return” to Asia means that the U.S. is treating Chin as a threat, then Beijing will be forced to fundamentally revise its foreign policy and it could spark the beginning of a “new Cold War”. Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said that if we do not recognize that the intensification of friction between China and the U.S. are the result of interest competition between countries, but instead think of them as signs of hostility, then it will cause problems with each nation’s grand strategy”. If China decides that the “period of strategic opportunity” has ended, it may abandon its peaceful development strategy and instead choose a hard-line or uncooperative approach towards the U.S. and its “provocative” neighbors. This may enmesh China and the U.S. deeper and deeper into a “new Cold War”. In the event this happens, China will grow closer to Russia, North Korea and some Southeast Asian countries, while the U.S. is likely to upgrade its bilateral security mechanisms into a “little NATO” in East Asia. The U.S. may once again “lose China”, but some of China’s neighbors will now find themselves struggling militarily and with insecure borders and territorial waters. There is an old Chinese saying that goes: “With the skin gone, what can the hair stick to?” If China and the U.S. completely lose strategic trust, economic relations would slide, as would economic relations between China and its neighbors. The U.S. could still use its hegemonic position and hard and soft power to maintain the superpower status of the U.S. economy and the dollar, but its domestic inflation, fiscal and social problems would deteriorate. And China would also meet many troubles domestically and abroad.  In this scenario, the U.S. would very quickly grow stronger than China, but all parties would lose out economically and strategically. Europe, Russia, India and Brazil would benefit from a Sino-U.S. “new Cold War” and their national powers would grow.

　　In the third scenario, China and the U.S. maintain good relations, and focus any competition on the economy rather than the military field. Meanwhile, neighboring countries could maximize their interests, creating a positive scenario for all parties. Nowadays, countries like Japan, India, Australia and Russia have all increased their strategic investment in East Asia and the EU is also not far behind. But as the two most influential countries in East Asia, China and the U.S. are pivotal in shaping the regional order. It may help regional stability if China and the U.S. form a “group of two” (G2), but because it will subvert the existing regional order, it is not realistic. As a hegemonic power, it is difficult for the U.S. to take the initiative in sharing power with a rising power. Differences between the two countries’ political systems and ideology make the idea of a G2 even less likely. The U.S. is also faced with the possibility of its allies opposing closer Sino-U.S. cooperation, making it even more difficult for it to pursue a G2.
　　On the other hand, because of close Sino-U.S. economic ties and China’s rise, it would neither be realistic nor wise for the U.S. to contain China and push it into a strategic confrontation. It is in U.S. interests if it wants to “return” to Asia to maintain dialogue and cooperate with China and to play a relatively impartial “broker” role between China and its neighbors during disputes. Some scholars have suggested that the two sides should use “strategic reassurance”, “co-evolution” and “strategic restraint”, which all embody the idea that the two countries could achieve strategic stability. It is also very important for the two countries to show their willingness to cooperate by hosting each other’s warships, conducting joint military exercises, and joint search and rescue efforts and cooperating on disaster relief. In this scenario, China and the U.S. would send a clear signal to China’s East Asian neighbors that the U.S. does not regard China as an enemy, and it will not support some neighboring countries if they go up against China. It will make China’s East Asian neighbors more restrained during territorial disputes if Sino-U.S. relations are also stable. Meanwhile, China needs to fully respect U.S.’ concerns on regional security, and deal with disputes and promote cooperation with neighboring countries in accordance with the principle of “shelving disputes and going in for joint development”. China, the U.S. and neighboring countries can engage in trilateral dialogue. Through long-term and frequent interaction, the U.S. would play an “impartial” but leading role helping to keep the peace and facilitate talks, which would not only help the U.S. build a good regional reputation, but also maximize its strategic interests. In this era of globalization, arms races benefit no one, and it would be in everyone’s interests to focus on economic competition and cooperation. When the U.S. saw China improving ties with East Asia nations, it began pushing for the TPP. In a similar way, the TPP “forced” China, Japan and South Korea to accelerate their FTA negotiations. And ASEAN made decision to start Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which would speed up regional economic integration. This kind of economic competition and trade liberalization will help keep East Asia open and help keep its economy vibrant. Eventually an Asia-Pacific free trade area will be established.
　　To sum up, the first scenario ends with conflict or limited war, and all parties lose; the second scenario ends with a “new Cold War”, and again all parties lose; while the third scenario ends with better Sino-U.S. relations, closer regional economic ties, and everyone could be a winner. Because of competition and security worries, the first two scenarios are more likely to happen than the third.

How Can All Parties Win?

　　Although Sino-U.S. strategic competition is still in the initial stages and sovereignty disputes between China and some of its neighbors have not yet deteriorated to the state where war is imminent, hostilities between parties have present. That is why we need to urgently draw up a mutually-acceptable Code of Conduct to ease tensions and stabilize relations in East Asia by improving economic cooperation. If we allow tensions to worsen, hopes for a peaceful and stable East Asia will recede.
　　The foundation of good Sino-U.S. relations is for the two sides to hold themselves in check and promote cooperation with each other. The main source of instability in East Asia is the strategic competition between China and the U.S. and the two countries’ lack of trust of each other.  The two countries can help stabilize relations through such means as strategic deterrence, strategic checks and balances, strategic restraint and strategic coordination. If China and the U.S. were to adopt a Cold War-style relationship it would accelerate the arms race and drag the region into danger. Because China is not as powerful as the U.S. and its allies, it will be hard to strike a strategic balance. Both sides will benefit if they act with restraint and cooperate with each other.  Strategic restraint means that China and the U.S. clearly define their core interests and act sensitively to each other’s interests. The U.S. should abide by the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués and facilitate peaceful dialogue between China and its neighbors. Washington should also take into account China’s legitimate security interests. The U.S. is pursuing a freedom of action in the “global commons”, which means the U.S. security boundary would extend without limits. But the absolute security of the U.S. means the absolute insecurity of China. Washington’s “Air Sea Battle” was nominally designed to counter China’s so-called “A2” strategy, but in fact it may prevent China from defending its coastline or even deep sea areas. Because offense is less costly than defense, China would be wise to develop more advanced anti-satellite weapons, cyber warfare weapons and upgrade its nuclear retaliation capability. This could mean a spiraling arms race and strategic confrontation. Both countries have legitimate needs to develop relations with countries in the region, so there is a certain degree of competition for influence. However, if either acts unscrupulously to wield influence in the region, it might exacerbate tensions. For example, the U.S. takes Japan as the cornerstone of its East Asia strategy. It believes that if U.S.-Japan relations were to cool it would cause a “domino effect” in the region meaning that South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and other countries would also cool their ties with Washington, leading to the collapse of the U.S. alliance arrangement in Asia-Pacific. Therefore, China respects the U.S.’ alliance system when developing Sino-Japan relations and in its diplomacy in the region. It hopes to only play a constructive role. The U.S. has supported its allies in disputes with China, to strengthen the strategic advantage against Beijing, and this has led to the “Wolves Effect”. If China “shows weakness” in a dispute, it may trigger some other neighboring countries to “reach for a yard after being given an inch”. China and the U.S. should exchange views about strategic restraint. Strategic coordination requires that China and the U.S. bring neighboring countries into the fold in stages as well as strengthening bilateral strategic communications, improving crisis management and promoting security cooperation.

　　There are so many members in the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum now that both of them are inefficient and they are struggling to adjust to the new strategic environment in East Asia. There are three major triangles in East Asia: the China, U.S. and Japan triangle; the China, U.S. and Russia triangle; and the China, U.S. and India triangle. By promoting dialogue within these major triangles, we can also promote five-country talks and security cooperation between China, the U.S., Russia, Japan and India. Furthermore, some “middle powers”, such as Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Vietnam, can be invited into the dialogue. As the U.S. tries to extend its influence in the region it is beneficial for all of the big powers to get together as this reflects the political reality of the collective rise of Asian countries and it is conducive to the formation of a new balance of power to ensure peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia. Some U.S. strategists believe that the U.S. should stir up trouble in the region because it would make the U.S. stronger, but that is short-sighted.
　　Secondly, for all parties to win it is important that China and its neighbors should aim for joint development in disputing areas and put aside the conflict. With the development of civil society, it is increasingly difficult to rely on force to resolve territorial disputes. Even if a country seizes military and administrative control of a disputed region it does not mean that the problem is solved. The Malvinas Islands War, the Russian-Georgian war, the Koreans conflict, the Thai-Cambodian border conflict, and even the China-Vietnam Xisha and Nansha sea battles did not fundamentally resolve these disputes. As long as the two sides fail to reach a settlement, the dispute still exists, especially in the eyes of the nation’s public and politically it is unresolved.  East Asia has been able to develop so rapidly and see its international status rising over the past few decades because of the relatively peaceful and stable regional environment. Once sovereignty disputes take off, the countries concerned will suffer both economically and socially. These disputes will be a long-term problem for East Asia. They will not only hurt the countries concerned but also East Asia or even Asia. The region may no longer be able to continue its rise.  East Asia should learn from the post-World War experience of Western Europe to resolve similar disputes.

　　Third, if China, the U.S. and China’s neighbors focus on economic cooperation, East Asia has a better outlook in terms of stability and prosperity. The U.S.-Soviet Cold War lasted for nearly half a century because of “parallel markets” and “economic isolation” between the two.  Europe’s economy was hardly integrated into the world economy before the World Wars of the last century. Economic interdependence is a strong barrier to conflict and war. Better economic integration will help ease Sino-U.S. conflicts and sovereignty disputes between China and its neighbors. In this “post financial crisis era”, all countries are prioritizing their economies, their job markets and improving their national welfare. We should oppose trade and investment protectionism and continue to expand East Asia and Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. The Diaoyu Islands dispute has hurt economic relations between China and Japan. A dispute between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo (called “Takeshima” by Japan) has also damaged their economic ties. Fortunately, the three countries decided to start FTA negotiations and not let the disputes derail improvement to their economic cooperation. As a regional power, China should continue with these planned FTA negotiations and the construction of the ASEAN “10+3” and “10+6” free trade area. It should also accept the TPP. The Chinese government has clearly expressed its commitment to economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.As the world’s only superpower, the U.S. plays a prominent role in stabilizing the region and in the development of economic and trade rules. It should not introduce strategic competition into East Asia, but encourage countries to focus on economic competition. Since an FTA would affect national industries, countries should prepare their domestic industries for such a transformation and take measures to maintain social stability.

Conclusion

　　East Asia is the foundation of China’s development and the strategic focus of the U.S.. East Asia has gradually moved into the inner circle of the global order. The region has become an arena for big power competition and also a region where many sovereignty disputes have broken out. How does China view relations between the U.S. and its neighbors in the region? How does the U.S. view relations between China and its neighbors? How do China’s neighbors view relations between China and the U.S.? How do the three interact with each other? Every country needs to talk about these questions with each other. Members of the academic and strategic circles should also carry out more research on this area. China is not pursuing a “dominant” or “presidential” position,but China must take on a leadership role to ensure the region advances along a path of peace, stability and prosperity.